The paper is concerned with a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case when players are informed about the current position. We consider the game in control with guide strategies first proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. The construction of universal strategies is given both for the case of continuous and discontinuous value functions. The existence of a discontinuous value function is established. The continuous value function does not exist in the general case. In addition, we show the example of smooth value function not being a solution of the system of HamiltonJacobi equation.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study Nash equilibria for a two-player deterministic differential game in the case when the players are informed about the present position. We look for the universal equilibrium solution. The term 'universal Nash equilibrium strategies' means that the strategies provide the Nash equilibrium at any initial position. The notion of universality generalizes the notion of time consistency, and it is appropriative for the case when the players form their controls stepwise. Generally speaking, in this case the notion of time consistence isn't well-defined.
There are two approaches in the literature dealing with this problem (see [8] , and the references therein). The first approach is close to the so-called Folk Theorem for repeated games, and is based on the punishment strategy technique. This technique makes it possible to establish the existence of Nash equilibrium at the given initial position in the framework of feedback strategies [14] , [15] and in the framework of Friedman strategies [21] . The set of Nash equilibria at the given initial position is characterized in [12] , [14] . The infinitesimal version of this characterization is derived in [2] , [4] . In addition, each Nash equilibrium payoff at the given position corresponds to the pair of continuous functions; these functions are stable with respect to auxiliary zero-sum differential games, and their values at the initial position are kept along some trajectory [3] . Note, that in this case the Nash equilibrium strategies are not universal and strongly time consistent.
The key idea of the second approach is to find a Nash equilibrium payoff as a solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations [5] , [11] , [13] . In this case the universal Nash equilibrium can be constructed. In particular, they are strongly time consistent. However, the existence theorem for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations is established only for some cases of the games in one dimension [6] , [7] , [10] .
In this paper we consider the Nash equilibrium for deterministic differential games in control with guide strategies. These strategies was first proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin for zero-sum differential games [17] . In the framework of this formalization the player forms his control stepwise. It is assumed that the player measures the state of the system only in the times of control correction. At the time of control correction the player estimates the state of the system using on the information about the state of the system at the previous time instants of control correction. Having this estimate and the information about the real state of the system he assigns the control which is used up to the next control correction.
The choice of control with guide strategies is motivated by the following arguments. The universal optimal feedback doesn't exist even for the case of zero-sum differential game [19] . The universal solution of zero-sum differential games can be find in the class of feedback strategies depending on the precision parameter [16] , or in the class of control with guide strategies [17] . However, for the case of nonzero-sum differential games existing design of Nash equilibria in the class feedback strategies depending on the precision parameter doesn't provide the universality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the problem, and introduce the control with guide strategies. In Section 3 we construct the Nash equilibrium in the control with guide strategies for the case of a continuous value function. This function is to satisfy some viability conditions. Further in Section 3 the properties of a continuous value function are considered. We give the infinitesimal form of viability conditions. After we compare the value functions satisfying viability conditions and the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. The example showing that the continuous value function does not exist in the general case completes Section 3. In Section 4 we generalize the construction of Section 3 for the case of a upper semicontinuous value multifunction. In Section 5 we prove the existence of a value multifunction.
Problem Statement
Let us consider a two-player differential game with the dynamicṡ
Here u and v are controls of player I and player II respectively. Payoffs are terminal. Player I wants to maximize σ 1 (x(T )), whereas player II wants to maximize σ 2 (x(T )). We assume that sets P and Q are compacts, functions f , g, σ 1 and σ 2 are continuous. In addition, suppose that functions f and g are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase variable and satisfy the sublinear growth condition with respect to x.
If u ∈ U, v ∈ V then denote by x(·, t 0 , x 0 , u, v) the solution of the initial value probleṁ
We assume that the players use control with guide strategies (CGS). In this case the control depends not only on a current position but also on a vector w. The vector w is called a guide. The dimension of the guide can differ from n.
The control with guide strategy of player I U is a triple of functions (u, (1) with the initial condition x[t 0 ] = x 0 such that the control of player I is equal to u(t k , x k , w
Here the state of the system at time t k is x k , the state of the first player's guide is w 1 k ; it is computed by the rule w
. The control with guide strategy of player II is defined analogously. It is a triple
2 denotes the guide of player II, (t 0 , x 0 ) is an initial position. The motion generated by a strategy V , a partition ∆ of the interval [t 0 , T ], and a measurable control of player II u[·] is also constructed stepwise. Denote it by
. We assume that the Nash equilibrium is achieved when the players get the same partition. Let ∆ = {t k } m k=0 be a partition of the interval [t 0 , T ]. Denote the solution x[·] of equation (1) with the initial condition x[t 0 ] = x 0 such that the control of player I is equal to u(t k , x k , w 
. Here x k denotes the state of the system at time t k ; w i k is the state of the i-th player's guide at time t k . Recall that
A pair of control with guide strategies (U * , V * ) is said to be a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G iff for all (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G the following inequalities hold:
Continuous value function
In this section we assume that there exists a continuous function satisfying some viability conditions.
Construction of Nash Equilibrium Strategies
Here 
Then for each compact G ⊂ [0, T ] × R n there exists a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G. The corresponding payoff of player i is c i (t 0 , x 0 ).
Note that conditions (F1)-(F4) were first derived in [3] as the sufficient condition for the function (c 1 , c 2 ) to provide Nash equilibrium payoff at the given position in the framework of Kleimenov approach. In that papers the obtained equilibria aren't universal.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is based on the Krasovskii-Subbotin extremal shift rule.
Denote by E the reachable set from G:
Let L be a Lipschitz constant of the function
Also, put
Note that ϕ * (δ) → 0, as δ → 0. Let us introduce the auxiliary controlled systeṁ
Below we consider two cases.
Note that in both cases system (4) satisfies the Isaacs condition.
The following lemma was proved by Krasovskii and Subbotins (see [17] )
∈ Ω 2 satisfy the following conditions
If s 1 (·) is a solution of the initial value probleṁ
and s 2 (·) is a solution of the initial value probleṁ
for some measurable controls ω 1 (·) and ω 2 (·), then for all t + ∈ [t * , T ] the estimate
is fulfilled.
We assume that the i-th player's guide
is a previous time of the control correction, w i,(a) ∈ R n is a punishment part of the guide, and w i,(c) ∈ R n is a consistent part of the guide. The whole dimension of the guide is 2n + 2.
For any (t * , x * ) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , u ∈ P , v ∈ Q choose and fix a motion y 2 (·; t * , x * , u) satisfying condition (F2), a motion y 1 (·; t * , x * , v) satisfying condition (F3), and a motion y (c) (·; t * , x * ) satisfying condition (F4). Now let us define the strategies U * and V * . Below we prove that the pair of strategies (U * , V * ) is a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G.
) be a state of the i-th player's guide. Put
Let us consider two cases.
i =1. Choose a control u * by the rule
Further, let v * satisfy the following condition
Define u(t, x, w 1 ) := u * . For t + > t put ψ 1 (t + , t, x, w 1 ) be equal to w 
Choose u * satisfying the condition
Note that c j (t + , w i,(c)
Below let x + denote the state of the system at time t + .
If players I and II use respectively the controls u * and v * on the interval [t,
Proof. The controls u * and v * satisfy the condition
We apply Lemma 3.1 with
The definition of the strategies U * and V * yields that w 
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.1 with Ω 1 = P , Ω 2 = Q and h = f + g. The choice of u * (see (6) ) and v * (see (7)) yields that the inequality
holds with x(·) = x(·, t, x, u * , v) and
1 2 , the conclusion of the Lemma follows.
We need the following estimate. Let ∆ = {t k } r k=0 be a partition of the interval [t 0 , T ], and let {γ k } r k=0 be a collection of numbers such that
Then,
Proof of Theorem 3.1 First let us show that for all (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G the following equality is valid:
Let ∆ = {t k } r k=1 be a partition of the interval [t 0 , T ]. Denote the state of the system at time t k by x k , the state of the i-th player's guide by w
Hence using lemma 3.2 inductively we get that
and
It follows from (13) that
Since z i 0 = x 0 , we obtain that
Let φ j (Y ) be a modulus of continuity of the function σ j on the set E
We have, that
Since
Passing to the limit we obtain equality (14) . Now let us show that for all
Let ∆ = {t k } r k=1 be a partition of the interval [t 0 , T ], and let v[·] be a control of player II. Denote the state of the system at time t k by x k , the state of the first player's guide by w
). Also let z 1 k be chosen by rule (5) at time t k . We claim that inequality (12) is valid with
k+1 , then inequality (12) holds by construction. If z
k+1 , then using lemma 3.3 we obtain that inequality (12) is fulfilled also.
Therefore, we have inequality (13) with γ 0 = 0 and
Consequently, inequality (17) is fulfilled for i = 1, j = 2. It follows from (5), (10) , and (11) that
Condition (F1) and the equality z 1 0 = x 0 yield the inequality
From this and (19) we conclude that
Passing to the limit we get inequality (18) . Analogously one can prove the inequality
Combining equality (14) and inequalities (18) , (20) we conclude that the strategies U * and V * form the Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G. Moreover the Nash equilibrium payoff of player i at the position (t 0 , x 0 ) is c i (t 0 , x 0 ).
Infinitesimal Form of Conditions (F1)-(F4)
Define
Proposition 3.1. Conditions (F2), and (F3) are equivalent to the the following one: the function c i is viscosity supersolution of the equation
This Proposition directly follows from [20, Theorem 6.4] . Further, define a modulus derivative at the position (t, x) in the direction w ∈ R n by the rule
Proposition 3.2. Condition (F4) is valid if and only if for every
Proof. Condition (F4) means that the graph of the function (c 1 , c 2 ) is viable under the differential inclusion 
One can rewrite this condition in the infinitesimal form [1, Theorem 11.1.3]: for J 1 = c 1 (t, x), J 2 = c 2 (t, x) and some w ∈ co{f (t, x, u) + g(t, x, v) :
holds. Here D denotes the contingent derivative. It is defined in the following way. Let
denote a section of G by t:
and let the symbol d denote the Euclidian distance between a point and a set. Following [1] set 
Therefore, condition (22) is equivalent to the condition d abs (c 1 , c 2 )(t, x; w) = 0 for some w ∈ co{f (t, x, u) + g(t, x, v) : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}.
System of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Let us show that Theorem 3.1 generalizes the method based on the system of HamiltonJacobi equations.
It is well known that the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations provide Nash equilibria [5] .
For any s ∈ R n letû(t, x, s 1 ) satisfy the condition s, f (t, x,û(t, x, s)) = max{ s, f (t, x, u) : u ∈ P }, and letv(t, x, s) satisfy the condition
Consider the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations Proof. Condition (F1) is obvious. Since (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is the solution of system (23), we have that
The subdifferential of the smooth function ϕ 1 is equal to D − ϕ 1 (t, x) = {(∂ϕ 1 (t, x)/∂t, ∇ϕ 1 (t, x))}. Therefore, ϕ 1 is a viscosity supersolution of equation (21) for i = 1 [20, Definition (U4)]. This is equivalent to condition (F2).
Condition (F3) is proved in the same way.
Substituting w = f (t, x,û(t, x, ∇ϕ 1 (t, x))) + g(t, x,v(t, x, ∇ϕ 2 (t, x))) gives condition (F4).
Generally, there exists a smooth function (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfying conditions (F1)-(F4) not being a solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
Example 3.1. Consider the system
The purpose of the i-th player is to maximize
The variablesû andv satisfy the conditions
Hence the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (23) takes the form
The boundary conditions are ϕ 1 (1,
The function (c * 1 , c *
) satisfies conditions (F1)-(F4). Indeed, condition (F1) holds obviously. Condition (F2) is valid with v = 1, analogously condition (F3) is valid with u = −1.
Moreover both players can keep the values of the functions if they use the controls v = −1, u = 1. This means that condition (F4) holds also.
On the other hand the pair of functions (c * 1 , c * 2 ) does not satisfy the system of HamiltonJacobi equations. Indeed,
Therefore,v = 1. Substitution into the first equation of (25) leads to the contradiction.
Further, consider the functions ϕ 1 (t,
is a classical solution of system (25).
We have that for α ∈ [−1, 0)
Problem of Continuous Value Function Existence
The continuous function (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfying conditions (F1)-(F4) does not exist in the general case. Example 3.2. Let the dynamics of the system be given bẏ
The purpose of the first player is to maximize |x(1)|. The second player is fictitious, and his purpose is to maximize x(1). In this case there is no continuous function satisfying conditions (F1)-(F4) .
Proof. Let a function (c 1 , c 2 
for any u ∈ U, t + ∈ [t, 1]. In particular, c 1 (t, x) ≥ |x| + (1 − t). Condition (F4) means that there exists a control u * such that
This yields the inequality
From this, and (26) it follows that c 1 (t, x) = |x| + (1 − t). Moreover, u * (·) ≡ 1 for x ≥ 0, and u * (·) ≡ −1 for x ≤ 0. Hence, c 2 (t, x) = x + (1 − t) for x > 0 and c 2 (t, x) = x − (1 − t) for x < 0.
The example shows that we need to modify Theorem 3.1 for the case of discontinuous value functions.
Multivalued Value Functions
Theorem 4.1. Assume that there exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued function S : [0, T ] × R n ⇒ R 2 with nonempty images satisfying the following conditions:
there exist a motion y 1 (·) ∈ Sol 1 (t, x; u) and a pair (J
Then for any selector (Ĵ 1 ,Ĵ 2 ) of the multivalued function S and a compact set G ⊂ [0, T ] × R n there exists a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G such that corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff at (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G is (Ĵ 1 (t 0 , x 0 ),Ĵ 2 (t 0 , x 0 )) ∈ S(t 0 , x 0 ). Remark 4.1. Let U * , V * be Nash equilibrium strategies constructed for the compact G ⊂ [0, T ]×R n and the selector (Ĵ 1 ,Ĵ 2 ). The value of (Ĵ 1 ,Ĵ 2 ) may vary along the Nash trajectory x c * [·], that is a limit of step-by-step motions generated by U * and V * . However, it follows from Theorem 4.1 that for any intermediate time instant θ there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies such that the corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff at (θ, x c * [θ]) is equal to the value of (Ĵ 1 ,Ĵ 2 ) at the initial position.
Analogously, if x 1 * [·] is a limit of step-by-by step motions generated by strategy of player I U * , and a control of player II v[·], then for any intermediate time instant θ there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies such that the corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff at (θ, x 1 * [θ]) of the player II doesn't exceed the value of the functionĴ 2 at the initial position. Proof of Theorem 4.1 To prove the theorem we modify the construction of the guide proposed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We assume that the guide consists of the following components: d ∈ R is an accumulated error, τ ∈ R is a previous time of correction, w (a) is a punishment part of the guide, w (c) is a consistent part of the guide, Y 1 ∈ R, Y 2 ∈ R are expected payoffs of the players.
. First let us define the functions 
Choose u * by rule (6) , and v * by (7). As above, put u(t, x, w) := u * , also set ψ 1 (t + , t, x, w 1 ) := (d (8) . Also, let u * satisfy condition (9) . Put v(t, x, w) := v * . Further, set ψ 2 (t + , t, x, w 2 ) := (d 
Let us show that for any position (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G the following equality is fulfilled , and the following inequality is valid:
Applying this inequality sequentially and using the equality z (17) we conclude that equality (28) holds. Now let us prove that for any position (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G the following inequality is fulfilled:
As above, let ∆ = {t k } r k=0 be a partition of the interval
We add the element t r+1 = t r = T to the partition ∆. Denote
Let us denote the state of the first player's guide at time t k by w The choice of z 1 k (see (5) ) and lemma 3.3 yield the inequality
Applying this inequality sequentially and using the equality z 1 0 = x 0 we get estimate (16) for i = 1. Therefore, inequality (17) is fulfilled for i = 1, j = 2. In addition,
. Hence, using condition (S1) we obtain thatĴ
Since inequality (17) is valid for i = 1, j = 2, estimate (30) yields inequality (29). Analogously, we get that for any position (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G the inequalitŷ
is fulfilled. Equality (28) and inequalities (29), (31) mean that the pair of strategies U * and V * is a Nash equilibrium on G. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium payoff at the initial position (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ G is equal to (Ĵ 1 (t 0 , x 0 ),Ĵ 2 (t 0 , x 0 )).
Existence of Multivalued Value Function

Discrete Time Game
In order to prove the existence of a multivalued function satisfying conditions (S1)-(S4) we consider the auxiliary discrete time dynamical game. Let N be a natural number, and let δ N := T /N be a time step. We discretize [0, T ] by means of the uniform grid ∆ N := {t
with t N k = kδ N . Consider the discrete time control system
Denote by L ′ the Lipschitz constant of the function
Further, set
Lemma 5.1. If t * , t + ∈ ∆ N , t + ≥ t * , (t * , x * ), (t * , ξ * ) ∈ G, u ∈ U N , and v ∈ V N , then,
Proof. Let m and r be natural numbers such that t * = t
. We have that
Here u k and v k denote the values of u and v on [t
Therefore, the following inequality is fulfilled:
Hence,
Further, we have
Consequently,
This inequality and estimate (34) yield that
Applying the last inequality sequentially we get inequality (33). Now let us proof the existence of a function satisfying discrete time analogs of conditions (S1)-(S4).
Theorem 5.1. For any natural N there exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued function Z N : ∆ N × R n ⇒ R 2 satisfying the following properties
Proof. In the proof we fix the number N and omit the superindex N. Denote
The proof is by inverse induction on k.
Now let k ∈ 0, N − 1. Assume that the values Z(t k+1 , z), . . . , Z(t N , z) are constructed for all z ∈ R n . In addition, suppose that the functions Z(t k+1 , ·), . . . , Z(t N , ·) are upper semicontinuous. Define
It follows from the upper semicontinuity of the multivalued function Z(t k+1 , ·) that the functions ς 
This inequality and equality (38) lead inequality (37). Since the functions z → min v∈Q ς k+1 1 (ξ(t k+1 , t k , z, u, v)) are lower semicontinuous for each u ∈ P , the function
First, we shall prove that it is nonempty. Let z ∈ R n . Let u * maximize the righthand side of (35), and let v * maximize the right-hand side of (36).
The upper semicontinuity of the function Z(t k , ·) follows from (39), the upper semicontinuity of the multivalued function W k , and the lower semicontinuity of the function
Now let us show that the function Z satisfies condition 1-4 of the theorem. Note that conditions 1 and 4 are fulfilled by the construction. Prove conditions 2 and 3.
. It suffices to consider the case t = t k , t + = t k+1 . By construction of the function Z we have that
Let v * ∈ Q be a control of player II such that
From the definition of the function ς 1 k+1 we get that there exists a pair (Y
Hence, condition 2 holds. Condition 3 is proved analogously. 
Continuous Time Dynamics
The functions S N have the closed graph.
Lemma 5.3. For r > ν the following equality holds:
Proof. Let (t, x, Y 1 , Y 2 ) ∈ R r , x ≤ ν, and j ≥ r. There exists a quadruple (θ j , y j , ζ 1,j , ζ 2,j ) ∈ Gr r+1 S j such that
Therefore,
We have that y j ≤ x + 2 −j ≤ ν + 1. Therefore, (θ j , y j , ζ 1,j , ζ 2,j ) ∈ Gr ν+1 S j . It follows from formula (43) and lemma 5.2 that (t, x, Y 1 , Y 2 ) ∈ R ν . Since the quadrable (t, x, Y 1 , Y 2 ) satisfies the condition x ≤ ν we conclude that
The opposite inclusion is proved in the same way.
Define the multivalued functionS :
Note that this definition is correct by virtue of lemma 5.3. We have that
Proof of theorem 5.2 We shall show that the functionS has nonempty images, and satisfies conditions (S1)-(S4). First we shall prove that the setsS(t, x) are nonempty. Let ν satisfy the condition x < ν, and let ( 2 ) ∈S(t, x). Now let us prove that the multivalued functionS satisfies conditions (S1)-(S4). We begin with condition (S1). Let x * ∈ R n . Choose ν such that the following conditions hold
Let K ν be defined by (3) for E = B(ν + 1). Let N be a natural number, t * ∈ ∆ N , and ξ * ∈ B(ν). By conditions 1 and 4 of Theorem 5.1 we have that if (Y 1 , Y 2 ) ∈ Z N (t * , ξ * ), then there exist u ∈ U N , and v ∈ V N such that Y i = σ i (ξ N (T, t * , ξ * , u, v)), i = 1, 2.
We have the estimate
Let (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈S(T, x). This means that there exists a sequence {(t j , x j , Y 1,j , Y 2,j )} ∞ j=1
such that (Y 1,j , Y 2,j ) ∈ S j (t j , x j ) = S N j (t j , x j ), and t j → T , x j → x, Y i,j → J i as j → ∞. Let θ j ∈ ∆ N j be such that (Y 1,j , Y 2,j ) ∈ Z N j (θ j , x j ) and t j ∈ (θ j − δ N , θ j ]. Combining this, (44), and (45) we conclude that for any j there exists x Now we shall prove the fulfillment of condition (S2). Let (t * , x * ) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ S(t * , x * ), u ∈ P , t + ∈ [t * , T ]. We shall show that there exists y 2 (·) ∈ Sol 2 (t * , x * , u) such that J 2 ) ∈ S(t + , y 2 (t + )). We also have
This completes the proof of condition (S2). Conditions (S3) and (S4) are proved analogously.
Conclusion
In this paper the Nash equilibria for differential games in the class of control with guide strategies are constructed on the basis of an upper semicontinuous multivalued function satisfying boundary condition and some viability conditions. The main result is that for any compact of initial positions and any selector of the multivalued map it is possible to construct a Nash equilibrium such that the corresponding players' payoff is equal to the value of the given selector. The existence of the multivalued function satisfying proposed conditions is also proved. If the upper semicontinuous multivalued function is replaced with a continuous function, then the construction of the strategies is simplified. However, in the general case the desired continuous function doesn't exist.
Only two players nonzero-sum differential games with terminal payoffs and compact control spaces were considered. The results can be extended to the games with payoffs equal to the sum of terminal and running parts by introducing new variables describing running payoffs. Note that if the running payoff of each player doesn't depend on the control of the another one, then the players need only the information about the state variable to construct the Nash equilibrium control with guide strategies. The condition of compactness of control spaces is essential, and the methods developed in the paper can't be used for the games with unbounded control spaces. (Such games were studied by Bressan and Shen in [6] , [7] on the basis of BV solutions of PDEs.)
Future work includes the extension of the obtained results to the game with many players and the stability analysis of proposed conditions.
